The Doctrine Gap

This paper examines the absence of authoritative joint C-UAS doctrine, the fragmentation of C-UAS roles across Air Defense Artillery, Electronic Warfare, aviation, and maneuver branches, and the operational consequences that fragmentation has produced.

Drawing on the doctrine-development process under JP 3-01, ATP 3-01.81, FM 3-01, and FM 3-0, the lessons of Tower 22, the CALL NTC analysis, and the counter-IED doctrinal precedent of JIEDDO, it assesses the gap between what C-UAS doctrine says and what the operational environment requires — and proposes a framework for doctrinal development that matches threat evolution rather than trailing it by years.

• No authoritative joint combined-arms C-UAS doctrine exists; responsibility is fragmented across Air Defense Artillery, Electronic Warfare, aviation, and maneuver branches.
• Doctrine trails threat evolution by years, leaving tactical units to improvise against the defining lethality challenge of the current environment.
• The Tower 22 attack and the CALL No. 25-1093 NTC analysis illustrate the operational cost of that doctrinal gap.
• The JIEDDO / JIDO counter-IED experience offers a precedent for a dedicated joint organization — now echoed in JIATF 401 (Aug 2025).
• The paper proposes a doctrine-development framework that matches the pace of threat evolution rather than trailing it.