DOTMLPF-P Analysis: U.S. Military Combined Arms Countering Capabilities to Defeat UAS in the Modern Battlespace

Executive Summary

The proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has fundamentally restructured the air defense problem for U.S. joint forces. From low-cost Group 1 first-person-view (FPV) attack drones to sophisticated Group 3+ loitering munitions and coordinated swarms, the modern battlespace demands a combined arms C-UAS response that no single system or branch can provide in isolation. Current programs of record — including M-SHORAD, LIDS, the Coyote interceptor family, and directed energy prototypes — address important threat tiers but do not constitute a coherent, integrated C-UAS capability across the full threat spectrum.

This analysis applies the DOTMLPF-P framework — Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy — to identify the specific capability gaps in U.S. joint C-UAS operations and to develop a structured solution set. The analysis is informed by operational observations from Ukraine and the Middle East, the December 2024 DoD Counter-Unmanned Systems Strategy, the August 2025 establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 401, congressional direction in the FY2025 NDAA, and current service programs of record.

No single DOTMLPF-P line of effort is sufficient. […] A synchronized, cross-domain solution set across all eight pillars is required.

Central Analytic Conclusion

The C-UAS capability gap is simultaneously doctrinal (no authoritative joint combined arms C-UAS doctrine), organizational (fragmented authority resolved only partially by JIATF 401), materiel (no fielded system addresses the full threat spectrum cost-effectively), training (institutional training capacity lags threat proliferation rate), and policy (ROE frameworks inadequately address autonomous engagement against time-critical swarm threats).

1. Threat Environment: Framing the Capability Requirement

An effective DOTMLPF-P analysis begins with a clear-eyed characterization of the threat driving the requirement. The UAS threat to U.S. joint forces is not a single problem set; it is a spectrum of overlapping threats demanding differentiated responses.

The operational record from Ukraine is instructive. As observed by TRADOC’s Center for Army Lessons Learned and reported in AUSA analysis, neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces have achieved dominance in the UAS-vs-C-UAS contest. Both sides have innovated continuously, compressing the operational lifecycle of each defensive measure to weeks rather than years. This adaptive adversary dynamic is the central variable against which every DOTMLPF-P solution must be stress-tested.

2. DOTMLPF-P Framework: Analytical Structure

The DOTMLPF-P framework, as defined in CJCSI 3170.01 and applied across joint capability development, organizes analysis across eight interdependent lines of effort. For C-UAS combined arms operations, each pillar contains both existing gaps and addressable solutions. The analysis below proceeds through each pillar with structured gap identification, current state assessment, and solution recommendations.

3. Doctrine

3.1 Current State

Joint and Army doctrine for C-UAS is fragmented across multiple publications and does not yet constitute a coherent combined arms framework. FM 3-0 (2022) incorporates multi-domain operations concepts and acknowledges UAS as a significant threat vector, but does not provide authoritative combined arms doctrine for integrating C-UAS across maneuver, fires, air defense, electronic warfare (EW), and aviation. ATP 3-01.8 addresses air defense artillery operations, and JP 3-30 covers joint air operations, but neither establishes the integrated combined arms C-UAS framework that the operational environment demands.

The December 2024 DoD Counter-Unmanned Systems Strategy commits to “synchronize the development of operational concepts and doctrine” as a foundational line of effort, acknowledging the gap explicitly. The Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate has begun incorporating Ukraine-informed lessons into doctrine revision, but authoritative combined arms C-UAS doctrine at joint, Army, and Marine Corps echelons remains in development.

3.2 Gap Analysis

No authoritative joint publication establishes combined arms C-UAS integration doctrine across all echelons from BCT to theater army.

Existing air defense doctrine is written for a threat environment dominated by manned aviation and ballistic missiles, not swarms of low-cost UAS.

Roles and responsibilities for C-UAS operations between Air Defense Artillery, Electronic Warfare Officers, Aviation, and maneuver forces are institutionally ambiguous.

Rules of engagement frameworks for autonomous or semi-autonomous engagement do not address the time-critical swarm threat with adequate specificity.

Prior-to-launch interdiction — targeting UAS C2 nodes, logistics, and manufacturing — is not yet codified as a doctrinal C-UAS task at operational or tactical level.

3.3 Solution Recommendations

Publish a joint combined arms C-UAS doctrinal publication (JP 3-01.X) establishing unified terminology, roles, responsibilities, and operational concepts for integrating C-UAS across all warfighting functions.

Revise ATP 3-01.8 and ATP 3-55.6 to explicitly address combined arms C-UAS integration, including coordinated engagement sequences across kinetic, directed energy, and electronic warfare defeat mechanisms.

Establish doctrinal tasks for prior-to-launch C-UAS operations — ISR-to-fires integration against UAS ecosystem targets — in FM 3-0, JP 3-30, and supporting fires doctrine.

Develop authoritative ROE doctrine and legal frameworks for AI-assisted engagement authorization against time-critical swarm threats, in coordination with DoD General Counsel and the Law of Armed Conflict framework.

Incorporate adaptive C-UAS doctrine revision cycle — linked to the JIATF 401 operational feedback loop — to keep doctrine current with threat evolution at maximum 24-month intervals.

4. Organization

4.1 Current State

The organizational landscape for joint C-UAS has undergone significant restructuring. The Joint Counter-Small UAS Office (JCO), established in 2020 as the DoD executive agent for C-sUAS synchronization, was disestablished by Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s August 27, 2025 memorandum. In its place, JIATF 401 was established under Army Secretary leadership, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense — a significant elevation of authority. JIATF 401 consolidates Replicator 2 and all department-wide C-sUAS RDT&E, with $50 million per-effort approval authority and a forensics/exploitation/replication function that integrates intelligence with rapid acquisition.

At the service level, Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) branch retains operational authority for SHORAD and HIMAD systems. Electronic Warfare Officers operate non-kinetic defeat systems. Aviation assets operate in the same airspace with limited C-UAS-specific integration. Brigade Combat Teams have been issued interim C-UAS systems — including the DroneBuster and SMASH 30mm anti-drone optic — without fully developed organizational constructs for their employment. The Marine Corps’ award of a $640 million I-CsUAS contract to Anduril in March 2025 represents a more integrated programmatic approach, but organizational integration within Marine formations remains in early development.

4.2 Gap Analysis

BCT-level organic C-UAS capability and organizational structure remain underdeveloped. No doctrinal position exists at the BCT staff or unit level equivalent to the C-UAS Integration Cell concept operated by some deployed formations.

The relationship between JIATF 401 and service-specific programs of record requires clarification to prevent duplication and ensure joint solutions actually displace redundant service-level efforts.

NORTHCOM’s designation as homeland C-sUAS synchronizer creates a parallel organizational structure to JIATF 401 that requires explicit coordination mechanisms.

Air deconfliction between friendly UAS, manned aviation, and C-UAS engagement zones lacks standardized organizational cells and processes at battalion and BCT level.

Coalition interoperability structures for combined C-UAS operations — critical in any NATO or INDOPACOM scenario — are not yet institutionalized.

4.3 Solution Recommendations

Establish a standardized C-UAS Integration Cell (CUIC) at Division and BCT level as a doctrinal organizational element, with defined manning, equipment, and battle staff integration procedures.

Define explicit coordination authorities and RDT&E boundaries between JIATF 401 and service programs of record, with a published governance framework within 90 days of JIATF 401’s full operational capability.

Establish a joint air coordination element function at BCT level specifically for UAS airspace deconfliction — integrating ADA, EW, Aviation, and maneuver — modeled on the Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) concept.

Develop a NATO-standard C-UAS interoperability framework within existing Combined Joint Task Force C2 structures, with liaison elements from key allies embedded in JIATF 401 and service-level C-UAS programs.

Institute a 36-month organizational review mechanism (consistent with JIATF 401’s sunset review timeline) to assess organizational structures against the evolved threat.

5. Training

5.1 Current State

The Army established the Joint C-sUAS University at Fort Sill as the institutional training center for C-UAS, with its first class convening in 2020. Training curricula cover system operation for specific C-UAS platforms, threat identification, and basic engagement procedures. The FY2025 NDAA Section 925 directed the Secretary of Defense to report on C-UAS training efforts, reflecting congressional recognition that training capacity has not kept pace with the operational requirement. Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have begun integrating realistic UAS/C-UAS scenarios into rotation objectives, representing genuine progress, but coverage is inconsistent across units and threat representations lag current operational platforms.

5.2 Gap Analysis

Institutional training capacity at Fort Sill’s C-UAS University is insufficient to train the volume of operators required for full-force integration of C-UAS systems across BCTs and support formations.

Training scenarios at CTCs underrepresent the Group 1 threat tier (modified commercial drones, FPV attack systems) relative to their operational prevalence in current conflicts.

Combined arms collective training that integrates C-UAS with maneuver, fires, EW, and aviation in realistic contested airspace is limited. Most current training isolates C-UAS as a separate functional task.

Swarm engagement training — the most technically and cognitively demanding C-UAS scenario — has no established institutional training program at scale.

Unit-level operator proficiency degrades rapidly without access to live-fly training ranges; range access and expendable UAS target supply are both constrained.

5.3 Solution Recommendations

Expand C-UAS University throughput by 300% within 24 months through additional instructor capacity, mobile training teams, and distributed delivery via the Army Learning Management System (ALMS) for foundational knowledge competencies.

Mandate C-UAS collective training objectives in all Combat Training Center rotations, with standardized threat representative drone packages (including Group 1 and swarm profiles) and opposing force (OPFOR) C-UAS tactics reflecting Ukraine and Middle East operational patterns.

Develop a Combined Arms C-UAS collective training exercise series at BCT level, analogous to the CALFEX model, integrating all C-UAS defeat mechanisms with maneuver and fires in a contested airspace environment.

Establish a virtual training environment (VTE) for swarm engagement training, modeled on Project Convergence experimentation, enabling high-volume repetitions against AI-simulated swarm behavior without live-fly resource constraints.

Institute a Live-Fly C-UAS Training Range expansion program at Fort Sill and complementary installations, increasing expendable UAS target supply contracts to meet estimated 600% growth in required training sorties.

6. Materiel

6.1 Current State

The U.S. military has fielded a portfolio of C-UAS materiel solutions at various maturity levels, but no integrated, layered capability addresses the full threat spectrum at operationally sustainable cost ratios. Key programs of record and emerging systems are summarized below.

6.2 Gap Analysis

No fielded system provides a cost-sustainable defeat mechanism against high-volume Group 1 threats. The Coyote interceptor is acknowledged by Army officials as effective but not cost-effective against sub-$500 FPV drones.

Directed energy systems — the only path to structural cost sustainability — remain delayed, with M-SHORAD Increment 2 HEL behind schedule and reporting mixed operational results in its 2024 combat deployment.

Sensor fusion architecture is fragmented across service-specific systems. No joint, interoperable common operating picture for UAS threats exists across Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force C-UAS sensor networks.

Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAADC2), while being upgraded with AI targeting integration, does not yet provide reliable automated engagement queuing against swarm-scale threats within the engagement timelines required.

JIATF 401’s $50M per-effort approval authority, while useful for sprint acquisitions, does not address the sustained industrial base investment required to scale directed energy component production.

6.3 Solution Recommendations

Accelerate M-SHORAD Increment 2 HEL development under an Other Transaction Authority agreement with a 24-month initial operational capability target, accepting technology risk in exchange for timeline compression. Establish a parallel industrial base investment program for critical directed energy components (optical elements, beam control subsystems) with U.S.-domestic sourcing requirements.

Develop a Joint C-UAS Common Operating Picture (JCUASCOP) integrating sensor feeds from LIDS, M-SHORAD, Anduril Lattice, DRAKE, and allied systems into a single shared recognized air picture, accessible at all echelons from BCT through theater army. Fund under a joint Program of Record, not a service program, to ensure interoperability.

Establish a Low-Cost Kinetic Interceptor program within JIATF 401 specifically targeting Group 1 defeat at a per-engagement cost below $1,000, leveraging Replicator 2’s commercial solutions pathway. Evaluate loitering interceptor concepts, directed fragmentation, and AI-guided micro-munitions as candidate approaches.

Resource a High-Power Microwave (HPM) fielding program for fixed installation defense under Replicator 2, with explicit electronic fratricide risk mitigation built into the system design and employment protocols.

Mandate open-architecture, modular design standards for all new C-UAS materiel programs, enabling block upgrades on 18-month cycles aligned with threat evolution — a lesson directly derived from Ukraine operational experience.

7. Leadership and Education

7.1 Current State and Gap Analysis

C-UAS is not yet a primary professional military education (PME) focus at the level commensurate with its operational significance. Air Defense Artillery officers receive foundational C-UAS instruction, but maneuver officers — who command formations that will operate in UAS-contested environments — receive minimal C-UAS integration education at the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), or Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Senior leader education at the Army War College and equivalents addresses the strategic dimensions of drone warfare but does not produce operational-level C-UAS integration expertise.

The institutional culture challenge identified by TRADOC and AUSA analysis — that two decades of COIN operations have imprinted a generation of leaders on a permissive airspace environment — is a leadership and education problem as much as it is a doctrine or training problem. The doctrinal shift to assume persistent UAS surveillance and attack threat from the outset of operations must be driven by leader education and reinforced through realistic exercises.

7.2 Solution Recommendations

Integrate C-UAS combined arms operations as a core curriculum block — minimum 20 hours of instruction — at BOLC for all combat arms and combat support branches, and as a primary planning exercise at MCCC and CGSC.

Establish a Senior Leader C-UAS Seminar Series for O-6 and above leaders, delivered by JIATF 401 and service C-UAS program managers, covering current threat developments, system capabilities, and operational integration considerations.

Incorporate C-UAS integration into all commander’s course decision-making exercises at Combat Training Centers, specifically requiring commanders to address UAS threat mitigation as part of the Mission Analysis and Operational Planning process — not as an afterthought adjunct to the main effort.

Develop a C-UAS specialization track within the Information Operations / Electronic Warfare functional area, producing officers with expertise across the full C-UAS kill chain — detect, identify, defeat — for assignment to JIATF 401, combatant command staffs, and theater-level C-UAS planning positions.

8. Personnel

8.1 Current State and Gap Analysis

The personnel foundation for C-UAS operations is primarily the Army Air Defense Artillery branch and Marine Corps LAAD battalions. Both are sized for a pre-UAS-proliferation threat environment that did not anticipate the volume and distribution of C-UAS operational requirements now evident. EW officers who operate key non-kinetic C-UAS systems are a small community with high demand across multiple competing mission sets. Civilian technical experts with directed energy and AI/ML expertise are in direct competition with the commercial technology sector for talent.

8.2 Solution Recommendations

Conduct a C-UAS personnel requirements review across all services within 180 days, quantifying the manning requirement against the projected full-force fielding plan for C-UAS systems, and generate targeted MTOE adjustments to reflect the validated requirement.

Expand ADA branch accessions and LAAD battalion capacity commensurate with the M-SHORAD and LIDS fielding plan, preventing the creation of fielded systems without trained operators — a failure mode that has characterized previous capability fielding.

Develop a Civilian Acquisition Workforce talent pipeline for JIATF 401 and service C-UAS program offices, specifically targeting engineers with directed energy, RF systems, and AI/ML backgrounds through DoD SMART scholarship programs, partnerships with Georgia Tech, MIT Lincoln Lab, and equivalent institutions.

Establish a Reserve Component C-UAS unit structure to provide surge capacity for homeland defense C-UAS operations under NORTHCOM, consistent with the Replicator 2 installation defense mission and the C-UAS Task Force authority established under FY2025 NDAA Section 925.

9. Facilities

9.1 Current State and Gap Analysis

C-UAS training and testing facilities are a binding constraint on capability development velocity. Fort Sill’s C-UAS University and Yuma Proving Ground represent the primary institutional infrastructure, but both are capacity-limited against the scale of training and test requirements generated by the expanding C-UAS portfolio. The JCO’s fifth C-sUAS demonstration at Yuma in June 2024 — which launched more than 40 UAS targets per session — revealed the limits of current range infrastructure for realistic swarm testing.

Fixed C-UAS installations at DoD facilities are protected under the Replicator 2 initiative, but physical facility hardening standards, sensor coverage planning, and system integration infrastructure at existing installations are inconsistent. Many installations lack the power generation and distribution infrastructure required for operational high-energy laser deployment.

9.2 Solution Recommendations

Develop a Joint C-UAS Test and Evaluation Complex at Yuma Proving Ground — or a designated co-facility — purpose-built for multi-system, multi-threat-tier testing with hardened telemetry infrastructure, realistic urban terrain, and the power generation capacity required for directed energy system testing.

Expand C-UAS live-fly training ranges at Fort Sill, Fort Cavazos, and MCAS Yuma with dedicated airspace, expendable UAS target contracts, and the ground infrastructure to support full BCT-level combined arms C-UAS collective training events.

Develop and publish DoD standard C-UAS facility infrastructure specifications — covering sensor coverage geometry, power requirements, communications architecture, and hardening standards — to govern Replicator 2 installation defense investments and eliminate the current inconsistency across installations.

Establish JIATF 401 headquarters with dedicated classified facility space for forensics, exploitation, and replication functions, co-located with or directly connected to key intelligence production nodes to minimize the timeline from captured system to C-UAS adaptation.

10. Policy

10.1 Current State

Policy is the cross-cutting DOTMLPF-P element that either enables or constrains every other pillar. The DoD’s C-UAS policy landscape includes: the December 2024 Counter-Unmanned Systems Strategy (classified, unclassified fact sheet released); the August 2025 JIATF 401 establishment memorandum; Title 10 U.S.C. §130i governing DoD C-UAS authority in the United States; and the NDAA-directed C-UAS Task Force (FY2025 NDAA §925). Congress has repeatedly expressed concern about the pace of C-UAS acquisition and the adequacy of authority frameworks for C-UAS operations in U.S. airspace.

Three policy dimensions present the most acute gaps: (1) ROE for autonomous/semi-autonomous engagement against time-critical swarm threats; (2) legal authority for C-UAS operations in U.S. airspace, particularly in the context of installation defense; and (3) acquisition policy governing the speed-vs-competition tension in C-UAS procurement.

10.2 Gap Analysis

Standing ROE for autonomous engagement authorization against time-critical swarm threats does not exist at classification levels accessible to BCT and below commanders. The latency of human-in-the-loop engagement authorization may be incompatible with swarm defeat at operationally relevant rates.

10 U.S.C. §130i as currently structured limits C-UAS authority to specific covered facilities. Expansion of this authority — supported by DoD in its April 2024 legislative proposal — has not been enacted, leaving a statutory gap for emerging homeland threats.

Acquisition policy, despite E.O. 14269 directing streamlined defense procurement and JIATF 401’s expanded authority, still defaults to traditional competition processes for C-UAS systems that have compressed technology lifetimes and require iterative, sprint-based development.

Export control policy (ITAR/EAR) constrains the speed and depth of C-UAS technology sharing with allied partners whose operational experience — particularly Ukrainian forces and Israeli operators — contains the highest-quality real-time C-UAS lessons available.

10.3 Solution Recommendations

Develop and publish standing ROE for C-UAS autonomous and semi-autonomous engagement at OCONUS and CONUS locations, with delegated engagement authority at appropriate command levels and explicit friend-or-foe identification thresholds tied to fielded technology capabilities — not aspirational system performance.

Pursue permanent legislative authority for C-UAS operations at all DoD installations under 10 U.S.C. §130i, extending beyond the current covered facilities definition, and work with DHS and DOJ to establish a whole-of-government C-UAS legal framework that eliminates agency seams in the threat response chain.

Issue DoD acquisition policy guidance establishing C-UAS as a designated rapid acquisition mission area, with pre-authorization for OTA, Middle Tier, and continuous competition approaches as the default rather than the exception — requiring justification for traditional FAR Part 15 approaches rather than for rapid pathways.

Pursue a C-UAS Technology Sharing Agreement (CTAS) framework with Five Eyes partners and key allies (Israel, Ukraine as applicable), establishing a classified channel for rapid exchange of defeat mechanism performance data, threat characterization, and countermeasure developments under existing information sharing agreements.

11. Integrated DOTMLPF-P Solution Matrix

The following matrix provides a consolidated view of the DOTMLPF-P solution set, organized by implementation timeline and priority.

12. Conclusion

The DOTMLPF-P analysis presented in this document establishes that the U.S. military’s C-UAS capability gap is structural — rooted not in any single deficiency but in the misalignment between all eight pillars of capability development and the pace and character of the modern UAS threat. The establishment of JIATF 401, the December 2024 DoD Counter-Unmanned Systems Strategy, and the FY2025 NDAA legislative direction represent meaningful institutional progress. They are necessary but insufficient without the synchronized cross-pillar solution set detailed in this analysis.

Three imperatives are paramount. First, the acquisition and fielding velocity for directed energy solutions must be elevated to a strategic priority with the institutional commitment and resource protection commensurate with that designation. Second, joint doctrine for combined arms C-UAS operations must be published, institutionalized in PME, and exercised at scale in CTCs — creating the human and procedural interoperability that Allied doctrine produces in conventional warfighting functions. Third, the JIATF 401 forensics and exploitation function must be operationalized as a rapid feedback mechanism from the battlefield to the acquisition system, compressing the time from threat observation to countermeasure fielding to match the adaptation cycles that adversary drone operators have demonstrated.

The adaptive adversary will not wait for programmatic completion or doctrinal publication.

§ 12 Conclusion

The solution set must be pursued with the same urgency and iterative innovation that has characterized the most effective C-UAS employment by forces in contact — measured not in acquisition cycles but in operational outcomes.